MagLev crashed in Germany

[Train-a-Mania]

That's bad.

The problem with us (humans) is that we don't always consider the "what if's" when it comes to safety (although sometimes too much, when it comes to airline security).

A couple questions I have:
What type of vehicle was on the tracks?
How come the computer didn't know about it or detect it?

It would be a shame to see it disappear since it's one of the first (if not the first) accidents with a maglev.

Very bad.

[Wile E. Coyote]

Very sad.
I didn't thought something like this would happen. But humans are strange creatures...

[Purno]

Here in the Netherlands we sometimes say;

"Who works, makes mistakes"

It's a sad mistake which should've happened tho.

[spaceman-spiff]

Here in the Netherlands we sometimes say;

"Who works, makes mistakes"

It's a sad mistake which should've happened tho.

Those that do nothing make no mistakes

[TossIB]

[...]A couple questions I have:
What type of vehicle was on the tracks?
How come the computer didn't know about it or detect it?

It was a maintenance vehicle to clear the track of twigs and dirt. BTW The two workers on it jumped right off when the Transrapid crashed into them. They are both injured because of the height (but alive at least...).

This maintenance vehicle didn't use either the magnetic leviatation nor the linear motor but rubber tires and a conventional diesel engine. This way, I assume, it is sort of invisible to the security system. Just like a rock on the track would be. No question that this is a major lapse.
Maybe this problem is already well known but no appropriate solution was built into the track since. Remember that this is a (rather old) test track. It is built with a variety of materials and techniques not necessarily very compatible. Considering this, I think it's no wonder that automated security is lacking.

Those that do nothing make no mistakes

Those that do nothing make nothing right also...


Some - maybe OT - words about the current situation:
The Public Prosecutor opened an investigation against 3 men accusing them of negligent homicide in 23 cases. A lawyer representing the relatives of some victims announced to sue the operating company. Incredibly all the haters and critics didn't act up yet.

[Rob]

Considering this, I think it's no wonder that automated security is lacking.

They could have made some control system to check wether the maintenace vehicle was in its garage or not. Quite easy to do if you ask me.

[Griff]

So i read, apparently the should have checked that it was off the track by sight. How silly is that.

[michael blunck]

Well,

- Obviously, the TR doesn´t have any effective emergency brakes. I.e., it´s not possible to stop the TR at a given speed (200km/h, 400km/h, ...) and a given distance. This is possibly a dangerous mis-construction in the light that even on a track 4 to 5 meters high there might be serious obstacles.

In conventional railway operation, trains are equally unable to stop "at sight", but this is compensated by a sophisticated signalling and surveillancce system (which doesn´t seem to exist in the TR framework). In addition, speeds of conventional rail are lower (although ICE travels by 280km/h) and vehicles are (at least were: modern MUs are often light-weight) much more rigid.

- There seemed no effective security measures been in effect on the Lathen test facility, in spite of regular passenger transport there. Even the prosecutor of Osnabrück put it: "Wir müssen davon ausgehen, dass es wenig technische Sicherungen auf der Strecke gibt" ["We can proceed from the assumption that there are few technical security measures on the track."]

Meanwhile, when trying to check the radio traffic between the maintenance vehicle and the control center, it turned out that literally technology from the 1970s has been used.

Asked about that, the head of the IABG (Rudolf Schwarz) said yesterday that this had been find faulty already by employees but it couldn´t helped by the IABG because at that time they "weren´t responsible for the track". Instead, the responsibility laid with the holder of the operating licence. Asked about who had been the owner at that time, Mr. Schwarz said this is "unknown". (!) ["Zuständig für die Ablehnung sei der Inhaber der Betriebserlaubnis gewesen. Es sei jedoch heute nicht klar, wer das gewesen sei."]

I knew it had to be something to do with the well-known german bureaucracy.

- In addition, in a frontal crash the shape of the TR encourages "climbing" of the adversary vehicle with all its devastating results. A fact which had been noticed already in the past in collisions between "normal" locomotives and modern light-weight rail cars (the Süßen crash comes to mind ...)

- Last but not least, there could well be accidents caused by fire as already had occured on the Shanghai TR, BTW. The Kaprun accident of November 2000 had already proven that even an "inflammable" vehicle may be the source of a devastating fire.

regards
Michael

[chevyrider]

As said before, the safety between two maglevs is 100% guaranteed.
It's impossible due technical layout of the power to them, that they can approach each other.
An other story it is when a non-maglev vehicle is on track.
It's invisible on the computer, so there have to be taken safety precautions in a logbook and on the computer.
This is a normal procedure, with what i have worked many times while driving maintenance trains on "Out of order" taken normal railway track.
In this case it's impossible to give permission to drive in a block what is marked with the label "DANGER".

[michael blunck]

> the safety between two maglevs is 100% guaranteed.

But only when travelling against one another.

The reason being the electromagnetic field which can move only in one direction at a given time.

But there´s no physical reason to make any collision between two TRs impossible, i.e. front-end collisions.

regards
Michael

[TossIB]

Not quiet sure on what you mean, but:

Since the track segments under, before and after the running maglev define the speed of the train it is not possible for two trains two approach each other.* The minimum distance will always be set by segment boarders. I'm not sure though what will happen when a rather fast train hits the segment of a slower train (or one driving against him) which is set to the speed of the other train. Will it promtly adjust it's speed or will it slip through the magnetic field?
Either way since segments must be set active for a train to run over them not only virtual (say signals) but very physical there has to be a central controlling all the trains on the track and there is no chance one train can get out of control.
And to make a long story short. There is an equivalent to signals on transrapid tracks, but invisible. No need for signals. No need for a driver either. (Technically)

One guy said, that all the security directives of the german railway are written in blood. Meaning that there has to be a crash first. But like michael blunck said before, those directives weren't even applied! That's the scandal. But has nothing to do with the Transrapid itself. The only thing one might blame the development of the transrapid for is that the front of the train wasn't able to withstand the other train. But maybe this is two much to ask for at 200 km/h...

To say it again, the crash wasn't caused by the Transrapid, nor by the new technology, nor is the technology faulty, but instead it was caused by people not applying some sane security directives.

---

* In fact the "Neue Bahntechnik Paderborn" desperately trys to solve this problem since they want to combine several coaches (powerd by a linear motor but driving on regular track) to a train while driving but without physikal link to reduce the air resistance.

[michael blunck]

> I'm not sure though what will happen when a rather fast train hits the segment of a slower train (or one driving against him) which is set to the speed of the other train. Will it promtly adjust it's speed or will it slip through the magnetic field?

That´s exactly the problem I was addressing above by the term "front-end collision" (Auffahrunfall). What would happen if a TR has to go down on its skids? And how long would be the "braking distance" then? Would it be possible to get up to a TR travelling at a lower speed (or being at rest) in front of the TR out of control?

> One guy said, that all the security directives of the german railway are written in blood.

Boy, you should see the records of the diverse british railways. Lever collars, Rule55 any one?

> But has nothing to do with the Transrapid itself. [...]

Well, that´s a question of definition. As the crash happend at the official test site of the TR, antediluvian security measures and communication technology has clearly something to do with the overall TR project, IMO.

regards
Michael

[TossIB]

>> But has nothing to do with the Transrapid itself. [...]

>Well, that´s a question of definition. As the crash happend at the official test site of the TR, antediluvian security measures and communication technology has clearly something to do with the overall TR project, IMO.

True. But the technology causing the crash is exchangable (and should be exchanged). The TR would be exactly the same with another security system and other communication devices. You see what I mean? Not the technology is faulty or the idea, but secondary technology which simply was too old. Not the scientists and engineers working there responsible for the failure of their product, but the management with refusing to ensure the security which engineers had asked for.